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ARTICLE I.

UTILITY OF PHRENOLOGY.

Phrenology is useful, because it forms the most correct basis of a system of mental philosophy.

The truth of no remark is more universally admitted, than that a knowledge of the human mind is at the foundation of human improvement. Every writer on mental philosophy has prefaced his work with a dissertation on the importance of his favourite science. Nor have such claims ever been disputed. Yet what has been done answering in any considerable degree to these high pretensions? Where is the volume, of the hundreds that have been written on the subject, from Aristotle down to the days of Dugald Stewart, which has had any important influence on the happiness of man? Men have distracted their minds with the subtle theories of the Nominalists, the Realists, the Verbalists, the Formalists, the Thomists, the Occamists, the Theosophists, &c.; but what practical knowledge have they carried from their distracting speculations into the affairs of life? or what speculative truths which tend to ennoble and purify the mind?*

But the tenor of these remarks perhaps implies a sentiment too unfavourable to the old philosophy. We are far from regarding all

* These views are not confined to phrenologists, says a distinguished writer in the Christian Spectator (1834, p. 6–13). "It is now twenty years since we were put to study Locke at one of our colleges. Locke is certainly one of the clearest—the most practical—the least dreamy of all the metaphysical race; and it is astonishing how little we have had occasion to apply any one principle taught in his copious pages. Whenever any remark has come in our way, it has never emanated from the essentials of his system. *Mixed modes, association of ideas, identity* and *diversity*, are sounds which have long since died upon our ears."

that those treatises contain as false, or even useless. No one supposes that even the speculations of astronomers, previous to the days of Copernicus, were altogether erroneous. Even the scanty records made by the Babylonians are not considered as of no value by our modern star-gazers. Little, comparatively, was known of the science of chemistry previous to the last century; and yet who regards as unimportant the experiments and investigations of the alchymist? In addition to discoveries of real value, they did what must be done in reference to every science—they explored the regions of error; so that succeeding philosophers knew that another direction must be taken to discover more successfully the paths of truth. It is somewhat so with the science before us. And it has been asserted, that as the theories of Copernicus and Newton affected the science of astronomy—as the discoveries of Davy, and others of his day, affected the science of chemistry—in nearly as great a degree have the discoveries of phrenologists affected the science of the human mind. Whether there are any good grounds for the support of such an assertion, we shall aim to exhibit the materials for judging, before we leave the subject.

As we have before said, we do not regard as erroneous or useless all that has been written by the old school philosophers. We have a high reverence for Locke, and Stewart, and Brown. They were men of powerful minds, and they often describe mental phenomena with eloquence and correctness; and, in fact, they say very little which can be objected to as really erroneous. Yet, as it appears to us, there are vital defects in their systems—defects, too, which are in a great measure supplied by phrenology. One great defect of their systems arises from the fact, that *they leave almost entirely out of view the connection of the mind with the brain.*

It is true that this connection was admitted by many philosophers previous to the days of Gall and Spurzheim. It is likewise true, that metaphysical writers of the old school allude to such a connection as *possibly existing.* Yet nothing is more evident, than that it has very little influence in modifying their speculations.

The importance of this omission will be evident, when we consider that it is *indisputably settled*, that one of the greatest causes of difference and variety of mental manifestations among men depends on qualities and circumstances connected with the brain. Three causes may be assigned for the differences in the exhibitions of mind among men:—an original difference in the structure of the immaterial spirit itself;—an original difference in the material instrument by which this spirit manifests itself;—and different influences to which both mind and instrument are subjected after existence is commenced.

Of the first we say nothing, because we know nothing. We only remark, that there is a strong probability that such a difference exists, and no probability against it. Why should not minds be made to differ in their immaterial essence, as well as "one star to differ from another star in glory?" We believe that such a difference does exist; yet to deny it would be more favourable to our argument.

Of the third source of difference we need simply remark, although we look upon education and habit as exerting a transforming influence in modifying the faculties of man—although it may be regarded as of more practical importance than either of the other two—yet it is not the only source of difference. No education could make all men Newtons or Washingtons.

But there is, beyond a doubt, a difference in the material instrument of the mind. Of this fact the phrenologist is so fully convinced, that he keeps it in view in all his investigations; while the old school metaphysicians seldom or never permit it to have an influence in modifying their systems. It is true they will sometimes descant, for a score or two of pages, on the probable existence of some subtle nervous fluid as the medium of sensation or volition; yet they never appear *fully to admit* and *feel* that the brain is the instrument of thought and feeling.

The defect in systems arising from this defect in premises is somewhat analogous to what would result in a system of natural philosophy, from leaving out of the account all mention of the imponderable agents—cold, heat, light, electricity, and magnetism. Are we called to specify particulars? We mention difference in mental activity, power, and susceptibility of emotions, as left untouched and unexplained; but which phrenology does explain, (as really as any natural phenomena is explained by man,) by referring them to difference of structure or quality of the brain. Other specifications might be made.

Other important defects in the systems of old school metaphysicians arise from the fact, that *they make their own individual consciousness the chief and almost only source of information.*

Says Dr. Brown, "In every situation in which man can be placed, as long as his intellectual faculties are unimpaired, it is impossible that he should be deprived of carrying on this intellectual study. . . . . No costly apparatus is requisite—no tedious waiting for seasons and observations. He has but to look within himself to find the elements which he has to put together, or the compounds which he has to analyse, and the instruments that are to perform the analysis or composition."* Nor does he ever appear to go beyond "*himself*" for

* Brown's Phil. Hedge's ed. vol. i. p. 5.

information. His own consciousness furnishes all the materials of his investigations. It is true he speaks of the various faculties as common to the whole race; yet nothing is more evident than that his own consciousness is the standard. We do not deny the importance of consciousness as a guide to a correct analysis of the mind; we would give it all the importance ever claimed for it. We can have no idea of a mental power without it; and many phrenologists have not assigned it its proper place as a source of information. Yet if there are other helps, they should not be neglected.

Dr. Reid (although he alludes to "the language of mankind" and "human actions" as "sources of information") says, in answering the enquiry, From what source must the knowledge of mind and its faculties be drawn?—"The chief and proper source of this branch of knowledge is accurate reflections upon the operations of our own minds."*

Dugald Stewart's language is still more explicit and conclusive. "I have attempted to show that the legitimate province of this department of philosophy extends no farther than to conclusions resting on the solid basis of observation and experiment; and I have accordingly, in my own enquiries, aimed at nothing more than to ascertain in the first place the laws of our constitution, *as far as they can be discovered by attention to the subject of our consciousness;* and afterwards to apply these laws as principles for the synthetical explanation of the non-complicated phenomena of the understanding."† Again: "The whole of a philosopher's life, indeed, if he spend it to any purpose, is one continued series of experiments *on his own faculties and powers.*"‡ . . . "My leading object is to ascertain the principles of our nature, in so far as they can be discovered, by attention to the sub- of our own consciousness."§ It is true Mr. Stewart alludes to *an life as exhibiting to our observation a boundless variety both of intellectual and moral phenomena, by a diligent study of which we may ascertain almost every point* we could wish to investigate, if we had the experiment at our command." He speaks of "savage society, and all the different modes of civilisation—the different callings and professions—the varying phases of characters from infancy to old age;—above all, the records of thought preserved in the volumes of our libraries."‖ But he likewise speaks of the "slender stock of

* Reid's Works, N. Y. ed. 1822, vol. i. p. 372.

† Preliminary Dissertation, p. 2.

‡ Prel. Diss. p. 35. These quotations are from first Am. ed. Stewart's Phil. Essays. Philad. 1811.

§ Elements of Philos. of Human Mind, note, p. 15. Bost. ed. 1821.

‖ Prel. Diss. p. 37.

experiments made directly and intentionally on the minds of our fellow-creatures."* He says, "As to the minds of *others*, it is undoubtedly but seldom that we have the means of subjecting them to premeditated and formal experiments."†

These quotations, from three of the most distinguished writers of the old school, exhibit, it is thought, the fundamental principle of their investigations; and Locke is evidently guided by the same principle. They all regard their own consciousness as the chief—as almost the only—source of information, and they have doubtless accomplished all we could reasonably expect. Nor are their labours to be despised. We shall now enumerate some of the more important defects of their systems, arising from this defect in the manner of conducting their enquiries.

First, they do not recognise all the primitive faculties of the mind.

In speaking of the utility of phrenology, a few days since, to one disposed to ridicule the new science, we mentioned this defect in the old systems of philosophy. "Ah! then," he exclaimed, "you maintain that phrenologists have discovered *new faculties* of the mind —faculties which have not been known to exist before?" The form and manner of the question evidently implied a mistaken idea of the subject; and to answer it with either the monosyllable *yes* or *no*, would be manifestly erroneous. But the truth of the proposition will best be illustrated by a reference to the science of chemistry.

Two thousand years ago, philosophers made the material world to consist of the four elements, *earth*, *air*, *fire*, and *water*. In this classification they embraced every form of matter contained in the more minute classification of modern times. They had doubtless *seen every element* of matter. Yet it can be said with propriety, that modern chemists have discovered elements unknown to men of former days. They have arrived at a more minute analysis. Whether a farther analysis of any now called simple elements of matter be possible, is entirely another question. However this may be, the progress they have made has been considered of the greatest importance in the advancement of modern science. It is somewhat so with the subject before us. Phrenologists, by a new principle of investigation, have discovered primitive elementary faculties of mind, the existence and functions of which were not known to preceding philosophers; and not only this, but they determine *what are* and *are not* primitive faculties in the former systems. A brief appeal to facts must support these propositions.

As some of the more important emotions and desires are not

* Prel. Diss. p. 37. † Prel. Diss. p. 36.

included in their treatises, we mention *the tendency to destroy—to conceal—to construct—to venerate*—which depend on the cerebral organs, Destructiveness, Secretiveness, Constructiveness, and Veneration. Other important faculties might be mentioned, of which we find only an indistinct recognition, in connection with some topic to which, philosophically considered, they bear perhaps not the most distant relation. And in regard to other important tendencies and emotions, their existence is a subject of dispute, and "their principles of investigation afford no satisfactory means of settling the differences of opinion: for example, Mr. Stewart denies that the love of property is a primitive faculty of the mind, and ascribes avarice to association." Dr. Brown makes the same denial, though he accounts for the emotion in a somewhat different way. "He and Reid admit a benevolent affection, while Hobbes and others deny it. He and Brown admit a native sentiment of justice, while Mandeville, Hume, and Paley, reject it; and Sir James Mackintosh considers conscience as a compound result of many affections. While philosophers refer only to their own consciousness, they cannot settle these disputes satisfactorily; because some men are conscious, and others are not conscious, of the emotions."* They are much in the situation of different individuals who should attempt to describe the mineral called *granite*. Each has but a single specimen. The one with a specimen of what is called *common granite*, says it is a compound of the three ingredients, *quartz*, *feldspar*, and *mica*, in nearly equal proportions. The one with sienitic granite before him, says it is a compound of four simple minerals; he finds hornblende in addition to what were mentioned by the others. A third, with a different variety of sienitic, asserts with the first that granite is compounded of only three simple minerals; but he finds *hornblende* instead of *mica* for the third ingredient. With him the component parts are *quartz*, *feldspar*, and *hornblende*. Now each may be, in the main, correct; and yet probably, confining himself to those ingredients which are most prominent, he has not observed those which exist in a smaller proportion. So in some measure with the metaphysician who trusts alone to his own consciousness. He describes the more prominent of his powers and feelings, while the less prominent are only incidentally recognised, and others still are denied an existence.

"By the phrenological method of observation," continues Mr. Combe, "these difficulties are greatly diminished. Each student is informed that he has the strongest consciousness of those inclinations and emotions, the organs of which are largest in his own brain. If

* Mr. Combe, in Phren. Journal, vol. x. p. 322.

he be very deficient in the organ of Conscientiousness, he is warned that his own consciousness is not a trustworthy index of the existence and strength of the feeling in other men. If he possess that organ large, he is acquainted with the emotion, and is capable of observing the presence or absence of its manifestation in other men. By comparing the size of a certain part of the brain with the vigour of this emotion, he may obtain demonstrative evidence of its existence. Cases of imperfect manifestation, if found in connection with a deficiency in the organ, will become additional proofs of its existence, instead of operating as facts negative of its reality."

These remarks of Mr. Combe explain the true cause of so much difference among the old metaphysicians, and clearly show the superiority of the phrenological method of investigating and analysing the human mind. The phrenologist does not discard consciousness in his investigations. He values it as much as Reid or Stewart, and knows far better than they how to avail himself of its assistance. But, in addition to this, he has other helps scarcely less important. For the sake of illustration, we describe the method of Dr. Gall's investigation in a single case. "Wishing to discover the primitive propensities of the human nature by means of observation, he collected in his house a number of individuals of the lower classes of society, following different occupations—coach drivers, servants, &c. After acquiring their confidence, and disposing them to sincerity by giving them wine and money, he drew them into conversation about each other's qualities, good and bad, and particularly about the striking characteristics and qualities of each. In the portraits which they drew of each other, they paid particular attention to those who every where provoked quarrels and disputes; they also distinguished individuals of a pacific disposition, and spoke of them with contempt, calling them poltroons. Dr. Gall became curious to discover whether the heads of the *bravoes* whom they described differed in any respect from those of the pacific individuals. He ranged them on opposite sides, and found that those who delighted in quarrels had that part of the head immediately behind, and a little above the ear, much larger than the others."* He followed up the hint suggested by this experiment; so that thousands of observations, by himself and Spurzheim, established the fact, that physical courage depends on a primary faculty of the mind, and is strong or weak, according to the development of a particular portion of the brain. This fact is now considered, by all who have tested it by observation, as well established as any fact in physical science. Similar statements might be made respect-

* Combe's Phrenology, p. 146.

ing most of the primitive faculties. Gall and Spurzheim gave up their lives to these investigations. For nearly thirty years they traveled from city to city, and from country to country, visiting prisons and asylums, and making their observations upon all classes and characters of men. Leaving our readers to draw conclusions, we hasten to observe *another important defect in the old systems of mental philosophy, consisting in classification of faculties of the mind.*

To show the truth of this proposition, and the superiority of the phrenological system, we quote the classification of Stewart entire. His first general division is into—1, *intellectual*; 2, *active powers*. The *intellectual powers* are:—1. Consciousness. 2. External Perception. 3. Attention. 4. Conception. 5. Abstraction. 6. Association. 7. Memory. 8. Imagination. 9. Judgment and Reasoning. The *active powers* are:—1. Appetites. 2. Desires. 3. Affections. 4. Self-love. 5. Moral Faculty.

I. *The Appetites* are hunger, thirst, and the sexual appetite.

II. *The Desires* are:—1. The desire of knowledge, or principle of curiosity. 2. The desire of society. 3. The desire of esteem. 4. The desire of power, or principle of ambition. 5. The desire of superiority, or principle of emulation.

III. *The Affections.*—1. The benevolent affections. 2. The malevolent affections.

1. *The Benevolent Affections.* As it is "not easy to enumerate them all," "the most important" are—The parental and filial affections; the affections of kindred, love, friendship, patriotism, universal benevolence, gratitude, pity to the distressed.*

We have no fault to find with the first general division of the mental powers into *intellectual* and *active* powers, unless we except the use of the word "*active*" as a distinctive epithet of the second class. And the arrangement of the *intellectual powers*, with some exceptions, is according to a principle in nature, viz. *mode of activity*. Perception, attention, conception, abstraction, association of ideas, memory, imagination, reasoning, are *modes* of *activity*, or powers of the intellectual faculties; though this principle of classification does not extend to all in precisely the same sense. Consciousness can hardly be denominated a mode of activity; and *conception* seems to be involved in *memory*. But passing over these and other defects, the principle is not extended to the active powers. The classification of these is sometimes according to *modes* of *activity*, and sometimes according to primitive faculties. But to show this, and the superiority of the phrenological classifications, we must briefly advert to the principles upon which the latter is founded.

* Stewart's Works, vol. iii. pp. 380, 381, 412.

The phrenologists call that a *primitive faculty* which is manifested by means of a particular portion of the brain, as the faculties of *Form*, *Time*, *Colour*, *Tune*, &c. Those qualities or powers which are common to, or depend upon, all or a class of the faculties, they call *modes* of *activity*. Thus *perception*, *memory*, and *imagination* are different modes of activity of each and all the *intellectual faculties*. The *affective faculties* have only one mode of activity, the *feeling emotion*. The emotions of the different faculties vary in kind and intensity. Difference in kind is indicated by the classification of the primitive faculties upon which the emotions depend.

That phrenologists have ascertained all the primitive faculties of the mind, (using the word faculty as above explained,) or that all which they now regard as primitive are really so, or that there are not errors and deficiencies in their system, is not maintained. Yet that the grand principle which lies at the foundation of their system—that different faculties of the mind are manifested through different portions of the brain (affording a ground for the distinction of primitive faculties from modes of activity) is according to nature, is capable of demonstration; and we have never yet heard or read of the individual who would deny it after a careful examination of the evidence. Nine tenths of those who deny the truth of the fundamental principle above stated, "admit that they have given very little attention to the subject, but they know it cannot be true." With regard to the other tenth, as far as our experience and observation extend, they invariably, in the course of a few remarks or sentences, exhibit great ignorance of the principles of the science. There are a few instances in which individuals have gone to work like philosophers to prove the system false. Such efforts have ended in a speedy renunciation of the pursuit, or a full conviction of the truth of what they were aiming to overthrow. Did time permit, we might give examples.

Such, then, being the facts in nature, it is easy to see the superiority of the phrenological classification over that of previous systems. In regard to every science, it is essential to a correct classification, that *genera* should be distinguished from *species*, *simples* from *compounds*, and *primitives* from *secondaries*. That this has not been done by Mr. Stewart, (the remark applies equally to Reid, and nearly so to Brown and others of their school,) is obvious at a glance.

First, *He confounds primitive faculties of mind with modes of activity*. This could not be otherwise; since his principle of investigation could not conduct him to a knowledge of what *are* and *are not* primitive faculties.

The appetites which he names are primitive and elementary. Of the desires, (and he professes to enumerate only the most important,)

some are elementary, others are general properties or modes of activity of *part* or *all* the faculties. For example:—Desire of knowledge is a mode of activity of, or depends upon, all the *intellectual faculties*. Desire of society depends upon a number of the primitive faculties. The *three desires*—that of Esteem—of Power, or principle of ambition—of Superiority, or principle of emulation—all involve the activity of *one* primitive faculty, *Approbativeness;* and two of them in addition depend upon *another*. With regard to the *affections*, there is the same or worse confusion. And the same defect in kind, if not in degree, extends to the intellectual powers. But we forbear further particular criticisms. The examples we have given illustrate the nature and importance of that defect to which we allude. With regard to about one half of the powers of the mind, as he classifies them, he recognises elementary faculties; one half of the remainder are mere *modes of activity*. The last fourth are involved in the other three fourths; and what is still more objectionable, a number of important mental manifestations he considers as the result of habit. After the classification of the intellectual powers which we have given, he remarks—"Besides these intellectual faculties, which in some degree are common to the whole species, there are other more complicated powers or capacities which are gradually formed by particular habits of study or of business. Such are: the power of taste; a genius for poetry—for music—for painting—for mathematics—with all the various intellectual habits acquired in different professions of life." (*Stewart's Works*, vol. iii. page 381.)

Again: the difference between the sexes is wholly the result of education. On page 228 of the same volume, he remarks—"In this opinion I have no doubt that Plato is in the right." That "there is no natural difference between the sexes, but in point of strength." . . "The intellectual and moral differences between the sexes, seem to me to be entirely the result of education." In a note on the same page—"Voltaire thinks woman upon a level with man in every talent but *invention*." Nor will the principles of the old philosophy conduct to the truth on this interesting topic.

We have taken the classification of Mr. Stewart as the basis of comparison. Our strictures would apply almost equally well to all the treatises of the old school metaphysicians upon this subject. It is true, Dr. Brown comes nearer phrenology in his classification; still his system is liable to the same objections in kind, if not in degree. Mr. Stewart sometimes remarks, respecting his divisions, "These are the most important"—"These doubtless do not embrace all our desires"—"They are not all stated as original principles or ultimate facts; some of them doubtless may be analysed into the same

general principles differently modified." But such confessions do not remedy the defect. It is a poor consolation to the reader, to be told that the views before him are immature and imperfect—especially when the materials and principles for a more correct view or analysis are within the reach of the writer. Although the reader may not be disposed to censure, when all is done which could be expected from the present state of human knowlege, yet he is disappointed.

We would not undervalue the speculations of Mr. Stewart, and others of his school. They often exhibit great power of thought and extent of research, and describe many mental phenomena with eloquence and accuracy. In their works are collected a vast amount of facts which are interesting and valuable; but more so to phrenologists than to any other class in the community. In fact, no one can understand the writings of a metaphysician of the old school as well, other qualifications being equal, as the phrenologist. And although *he* may sometimes be in the dark respecting the meaning, yet in such cases he probably comprehends the idea fully as clearly as the author himself.

But, it is asked, since the old metaphysicians describe real mental phenomena, and obviously take in most of the manifestations of mind in one place or another of their systems, of what practical importance is a mere philosophical defect in classification? Why is not Mr. Stewart's description of ambition, or *love of children*, or reasoning, as good as that of the phrenologist? We answer, in the same sense and for the same reason, that the descriptions and analysis of modern chemists are of more value than any thing that *was*, or *could have been*, *written* two thousand years ago upon the same subjects. Ancient philosophers embraced all matter in the four divisions, *earth*, *air*, *fire*, and *water*. Now it must be admitted, that this classification is based upon an obvious principle in nature—more obvious and uniform, perhaps, than that of the mental faculties by Mr. Stewart. And with such a basis, a learned and valuable treatise might be written. Much might be said of the nature and properties of *air*. There are various kinds of air; it is cold and hot; it is necessary to support life; when put in motion, it is called wind, and often proves destructive to objects on the land and the sea. Of *earth*, too, many kinds and properties might be described. One kind is favourable to vegetation; another the reverse. In one form it is called *rock;* there are various kinds of *rocks*, differing in degrees of hardness and softness, and applied to various purposes of utility by man. On *water*, too, and *fire*, they might be eloquent, and fill folios in describing their various properties and uses. And one half of every page might be occupied with notes of facts for illustrating the various

parts of the subject. Accounts could be collected of hurricanes and earthquakes; of storms by sea and land; of avalanches and devastations by floods and by fire. And every word in such huge treatises might even be true, and be dignified by the epithet *philosophy*. And if such descriptions embraced all that was known on these subjects, they would be received and considered as going to the bottom of the philosophy of matter. But is not a vast addition made to our knowledge by the discoveries which prove that the material world, instead of four, consists of more than fifty elementary substances? Although the ancients might be familiar with the useful purposes of *air* and *water*, yet is it an unimportant fact, that each of these is composed of two elements united, which elements are found combined in almost every form of matter? Although they might warm themselves by the fire, and prepare their food with as much satisfaction and skill as the *prince* of modern chemists, yet is it of no value to know that *fire* is not a substance, but simply the effect of a union of certain substances in particular circumstances and conditions in relation to each other?

The difference between the analysis and descriptions of mental phenomena, by the old school metaphysicians and the phrenologist, may be illustrated still more strikingly perhaps by a reference to astronomy. How many volumes might be written, even by the very men who imprisoned Gallileo for teaching the doctrines of Copernicus? What a splendid science! How important to be understood! First, there is the sun—the source of light and heat. It appears every twenty-four hours in the east, which is called its *rising*—rises majestically in the heavens—descends and disappears in the west, which is called its *setting*. In one part of the year it is visible three or four hours longer each day than at others. Two or three times each year, from some cause or other, it becomes totally or partially obscured; this is called an *eclipse*. Of the moon, too; it gives light by night—is sometimes visible in the day; it appears about as large as the sun, and, like that luminary, rises in the east and sets in the west. It appears larger when rising in the horizon, and diminishes in size till it arrives at its greatest height. About every four weeks it entirely disappears for a number of days, after which it again appears in the form of a narrow crescent: it is then called new moon; gradually becomes wider for two weeks, when it is perfectly round: it is then called *full moon;* again it diminishes in size till it entirely disappears. Of the planets, too, much might be written respecting their appearance and motions; and the stars might be classified according to their size and brightness.

Folios might be filled with such descriptions, and every word might even be true; yet what are they all worth, in comparison with

a knowledge of the simple fact that the sun is a centre, about which the earth and other planets revolve, according to harmonious and fixed laws? With a knowledge of this fact, how easy becomes a solution of all those torturing questions which must have distracted ancient philosophers?—"What are the limits of the horizontal plain of the world? How large are those elephants and tortoises which sustain the earth? Of what kind, and how large, is that serpent which at times swallows the sun and moon? And what power sustains those luminaries, and sends them in circles round the earth?" When Copernicus demonstrated that the *sun*, not the earth, is in the centre, how quick these mysteries are solved. Kepler, and Leibnitz, and Newton, seize the clue and disclose almost at once the whole machinery of the solar system. Other philosophers follow after, and by degrees fill up the outline sketched by their predecessors; though perhaps eternity must pass away, before created minds will have arrived at a full understanding of this part of the works of God.

We are well aware that many will regard these remarks as an unjust and illiberal caricature upon those metaphysical writers who do not adopt the theories of Gall and Spurzheim. Others will think that too much has been conceded in favour of the old philosophy. As for ourselves, we do not maintain that the contrast we have sketched between ancient and modern chemistry—ancient and modern astronomy—strictly applies in *all its particulars* to the subject before us. Yet we think it in the main correct. We think the simple discovery, "that the brain is a congeries of organs," and that different mental faculties are manifested through these different organs, is destined to effect *nearly* as great a revolution in the science of mind, as the discoveries of Copernicus have effected in astronomy, or those of modern chemists in the science of chemistry. With a knowledge of this principle, many *before* mysterious and controverted points are rendered clear and as firmly established as any facts in physical science. The phenomena of perception, conception, memory, attention, judgment, reasoning, the moral sense, partial genius, will, dreaming, mono-mania, all assume their proper place in the science of human nature; and this simple fact, that it accounts so clearly for so many otherwise inexplicable phenomena, is one of the strongest arguments in favour of the truths of phrenology. It is said that consciousness affords no evidence of the existence of the phrenological organs; and that such organs cannot be discovered on dissection. We reply, neither does the evidence of the senses reveal to us, or support the present theory of the solar system. But, on the contrary, the evidence of the senses is directly against such a theory. "It is not the *earth* that moves, but the *sun*. We are directly conscious

that the former is firm and immovable under our feet, while we *see* the latter moving through the heavens. This earth turn over every twenty-four hours? Impossible! for then the water would long ago have been spilled out of the mill-pond." Let not these remarks appear like trifling. They exhibit reasoning which strictly accords with the evidence of the senses, and is really as consistent as much that is advanced against the truth of phrenology; and, in fact, there is more evidence against the truth of the theory of Copernicus, than against that of our new philosophy; and, in addition to a thousand facts, the latter *actually rests* upon the same kind of evidence as the former—viz. *it explains phenomena*. But this will be seen as we proceed.

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE II.

FALLACY OF SOME COMMON OBJECTIONS AGAINST PHRENOLOGY.*

We know that the Creator has established laws by which his universe is governed. For our present purpose we shall only refer to one of them—gravitation. From the instant of creation, that law has been in perfect operation. The heavenly bodies have performed their revolutions in obedience to it; every thing in the material world has been subject to it. Man—created last—although for ages ignorant of the existence of the law, was as unconsciously dependent upon it as inert matter. He knew not that gravitation was necessary to keep him on his feet in walking—on his seat, while reading in his study—on his bed, while asleep; yet he walked, sat, and slept, in safety under the influence of that law.

When, at length, Newton discovered the laws of gravitation, what change took place? Much to man, in his power over matter as an instrument to effect the purposes of his will; but to the laws themselves—to matter—to man, as subject to those laws in his own person—NONE. The universe is sustained in the same calm, silent dignity, unaffected by his ignorance, unaided by his knowledge. The philosopher by knowing *why*, *how* he falls over the precipice if

* This communication comes from the pen of a lady. We deem it an act of justice, not only to the individual, but to the "fair sex," to state the fact. We should rejoice to see many such advocates enlisted in behalf of phrenology, and shall be happy to number them among the contributors to our Journal.—Ed.

he make a false step, can no more prevent the effects of that step than the weakest idiot. All his knowledge can do for him is to prevent him taking the step, by putting him on his guard, and that is much. On the other hand, the poor idiot, unconscious of the danger, unable to comprehend it, as certainly incurs the consequences which are the punishment of the step, as the philosopher; although the one by foreseeing may avoid the act which the ignorance and imbecility of the other renders, to a certain degree, to him unavoidable.

But do we imagine *danger* to mankind in the discovery or study of the laws of gravitation? Shall we abandon it because it gives an increase of power to the philosopher, of which the idiot is unable to avail himself? Or *dare* we say that the Creator is unjust in making man subject to laws, which may involve him in suffering and misery from his ignorance of them, which knowledge might have prevented, so long as that ignorance is unavoidable on his part? Or shall the study of the laws of gravitation, now they have been discovered, and the advantages which the application of them has already afforded, and will hereafter afford, to man, be proscribed, because by that study we cannot *alter* them; because we are compelled to submit to them as entirely while availing ourselves of their assistance, as we did in our ignorance of their existence? Yet this is the reasoning of many against PHRENOLOGY, which professes to be an exposition of the laws of mind—laws as fixed, as independent of our comprehending them, as the laws of matter.

Phrenology *makes* nothing—*alters* nothing. It can only reveal what, when we were in total darkness, *was* as it *is* now, that it has shed its light upon us. A propensity indulged beyond its legitimate limit, produces precisely the same crimes, and involves the same punishment and evil, whether we can give it a name and can predicate its action, or whether we cannot. Too great a desire to acquire property, unrestrained by a sense of justice, or a fear of detection or shame, will equally induce theft, and will involve the loser and the thief in the same consequences, whether we know or do not know that there are organs of Acquisitiveness, of Conscientiousness, of Caution, or of Approbativeness, acting according to their several laws. One man is habitually moral, almost without effort; another endeavours to be so, and at times succeeds, while at other times he yields to temptation; another is prone to evil continually. One man is wise—another imbecile. One child acquires a proficiency in music, in spite of opposition and difficulty; another cannot acquire mediocrity with the aid of the ablest instructors, and years of unavailing toil. These things ARE, whether phrenology be true or false—whether it be known or unknown. If in this arrangement there be

injustice, does phrenology create it? Did it not exist before phrenology was dreamed of?

If phrenology be *true*—(it is not our present object to prove that it is so)—if phrenology be true, it may and will do much to remedy these inconveniences; it cannot increase them. If we can ascertain the original powers of the mind—if we can discover what combination of faculties bring it most into harmony with the scheme of the Creator—and if, further than this, we can find that exercise will increase a deficient faculty, and that other means will repress a too active one—if we can see, *before* a crime is committed, the liability to yield to it, and at the same time, what counteracting powers are possessed, and in what degrees—have we not, by its means, as much a remedy for many disorders of the mental and moral world, as a knowledge of the laws of gravitation affords for many of the *accidents*, as they were once considered, in the physical world? We are asked continually by objectors to phrenology, "What is to become of those unfortunate beings, the class of bad heads?" We reply—Study phrenology, and endeavour to mend them; it will afford you invaluable aid. "But," again say objectors, "is it *safe* to believe in phrenology?" "Will it not do harm?" "Will it not lead to materialism, fatalism, irreligion?"

Is phrenology TRUE? If true, it is the hand-writing of God himself. As much so—as much a revelation of the nature he has impressed upon man—as the Scriptures are a revelation of his will. Is it possible that He who made man, and who sent a revelation to him, should not adapt that revelation to the being to whom it is addressed? If the mind of man and the revelation are *not* adapted to each other, one of two things must follow: either that God made man, and what purports to be a revelation from him is, in reality, a forgery; or that God sent the revelation to beings whom he did not comprehend—consequently, whom He could not have created. This would involve the existence of another God, and degrade Jehovah to the level of the old mythology, where each Deity had his own part to play, subject to counteraction and disappointment. Who would wish to subscribe to either of these consequences? Those who are most afraid of the first, will be the most unwilling to admit the second. Those who believe the Bible to be the word of God, can have no cause to fear that he has contradicted himself by the works of his own hand. Is it not arrogance—or worse, *blasphemy*—to say, as has been said, "If phrenology be true, religion—the religion of the Bible—must be false." Phrenology *is* true or false, and religion is true or false. Our belief or unbelief cannot alter the *fact*. Our believing or not believing may involve *us* in consequences advantageous or

disadvantageous, as may be; but it cannot affect the *fact* itself; *that* is entirely independent of us. Religion and phrenology, if true, are equally so in spite of our belief; or if false, cannot be rendered true by any unwillingness on our part to give up our faith.

It would be an easy thing to show that the human mind, as described by phrenology, is suited to the reception of *such* a revelation as the Scriptures contain; that the Scriptures are adapted to supply the wants of such a being as man is, phrenologically; that all the denunciations of the law are directed against the abuse of the lower faculties—all its promises addressed to the higher ones; to show that there is no faculty discovered by phrenologists, to which an appropriate appeal cannot be found in the Bible. But this is not our present object. Our object now is only to point out the fallacy of some of the objections raised against the study of phrenology; to show that it is the *duty* of every man, and especially of every man professing Christianity, to examine whether these things be so. We may as well gravely refuse our belief in gravitation, lest it should involve the creation in ruin, by proving that man is doomed to a limited sphere of motion, or because it may one day destroy our planet by drawing it into the sun, as to object to the study of phrenology, lest it should involve materialism or fatalism. To every believer in Christianity we make our appeal. Beware how you refuse to examine its evidence: for if phrenology be the invention of men, it will come to naught; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.

M. B.

ARTICLE III.

TWO LETTERS, ADDRESSED TO GEORGE COMBE, ESQ., ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANS OF LOCALITY AND WIT.

To the Editor of the American Phrenological Journal.

Philadelphia, 6th February, 1839.

Sir,—

I beg leave to transmit to you two letters which have been addressed to me, which I regard as so interesting that I have solicited and obtained the permission of the writers of them, to present them to the public through the medium of your Journal; from which I shall request the editor of the English Phrenological Journal also to copy them. The one is on the functions of the organ of Locality, and the

other on those of the organ of Wit; concerning the ultimate principles of both of which faculties considerable obscurity still prevails. The best method of throwing light on such points appears to me to be, to collect and publish the remarks of individuals who possess the organs in a state of very large or deficient development.

I am, &c.

GEO. COMBE.

Philadelphia, 1st February, 1839.

GEORGE COMBE, ESQ.

Sir,—Having recently had the pleasure of hearing a portion of your course of lectures on phrenology, I beg leave to submit to your attention one or two points wherein my own experience and reflection fail to harmonise with some of the descriptions which you have given. I am sure you will consider every individual illustration as valuable to the science, and you will therefore excuse the freedom which I now take in addressing you on the subject.

I allude, in the first place, to the manifestations which you assign to the organ of Locality. You consider that it not only gives a distinct remembrance of the looks of places, but that it also imparts an intuitive power of ascertaining their *direction*. That it gives the first peculiarity I can readily testify, both from my own experience and that of other persons in whom the organ has been fully developed; but that it has the power of imparting the latter quality, I am, from the same sources, compelled to doubt.

From my earliest days I have always found the greatest delight in looking at landscape paintings, and also in contemplating natural scenery; and I have been for many years in the habit of sketching from nature, as a matter of amusement. I have also at all times experienced the strongest desire to travel, for the mere purpose of seeing particular places; and could always readily conjure up a scene from reading a description, and carry it afterwards faithfully in my memory. This is evidently the operation of the organ of Locality; but I have always laboured under the greatest difficulty in endeavouring to find my way to any place by taking the *direction*, or point of the compass, in which it was situated. To such an extent does this difficulty exist, that it has very frequently been noticed by my friends; and those who are well acquainted with me, take care never to trust to my guidance in matters of this sort. On going out of a house after a first visit, I very frequently turn the wrong way, and proceed to the end of the street before discovering my mistake; and, in short, I have so invariably found myself in error whenever I have attempted to guide myself by mere *direction*, that I now never attempt to do so, but

always trust to my remembrance of particular *localities*, which supplies me with landmarks by which I can confidently pursue my course.

Having been accustomed, for many years, to find in phrenology a satisfactory exposition of all the peculiarities of mental disposition, I have often considered from what deficiency of organisation this peculiarity which I have alluded to could arise, and for a long time past I have been in the habit of referring it to a deficiency in the organ of Weight. My opinion in this respect is strengthened by the fact, that it is this organ which takes cognisance of the principle of gravitation, which regulates the *direction* of the planets in their orbits; while it is now very generally supposed that this principle is closely allied, if it is not in fact identical, with magnetic phenomena, from which we derive our means of knowledge with regard to *the points of the compass*. Moreover, upon considering the illustrations which you bring forward in treating of the organ of Weight, I think you will perceive that these illustrations tend to confirm the supposition that it is to this organ, and not to that of Locality, that a knowledge of direction is to be referred.

You state that a person having Weight large, will be enabled to send an arrow to a mark, and you attribute this to the nice sense which the organ imparts of the amount of force which is required to carry the arrow to a precise distance: but this is not enough to insure a successful aim; because although a certain amount of motive power carries it to the required distance, it does not follow that that power is exerted in the right *direction*, and the arrow might therefore fall to the right or to the left of the mark. It seems, then, that if it is invariably the case that persons with Weight large are able to aim with precision at a mark, this organ must impart a knowledge both of distance and direction.

You mention, also, the instinctive power of the American Indians in finding their way across wide tracts of country as arising from the organ of Locality; but it must be remembered that these warriors are always found to be excellent riders and good shots, either with bow or rifle, and they must therefore possess the organ of Weight in a very full degree.

From the consideration of these facts, I have been led to suppose, that matter being *mobile* and *inert*, the organ of Weight adapts us to the comprehension of that law of nature by which a body once set in motion, would, but for the presence of disturbing causes, continue in its course for ever; and that the organ of Locality takes cognisance of the inertness of matter, and giving us the power of remembering how things were disposed when we last beheld them, teaches us to

expect that, in the absence of disturbing causes, we shall find them in the same condition on beholding them again; thus Weight reconciles us to the mobility of matter, Locality to its inertness. If we possessed the one without the other, we should look either for perpetual motion or perpetual quiescence; whereas by the possession of the two organs we can easily adapt ourselves to the alternate operation of these antithetical properties of matter.

Trusting that you will not consider that I have obtruded these views upon your notice, I am, &c.

M. B. Sampson.

Morris House.

P. S. In speaking of the natural language of Benevolence, you confined your description to the notice of a portrait, beaming with an expression of good-will. Perhaps I may be allowed to suggest, that the "friendly nod," or instinctive bending forward of the head, with which we greet a person to whom we feel kindly disposed, is also part of the natural language of this organ. You must have observed, that there exists a class of persons in whom Self-esteem is large and Benevolence small, who never condescend to *nod*—who pride themselves, indeed, upon the dexterity with which they can "cut" those with whom at some former time they have been perfectly familiar; while there are others to whom the mere attempt to pass any one with whom they had once been acquainted, without this salutation, would be absolutely painful, and who would find themselves betrayed into a nod, despite of all their efforts.

It may be remarked, also, that persons of kind disposition have a habit of nodding gently to those with whom they may be in conversation; the same action may likewise be observed when they are excited by feelings of compassion.

It is possible that these points may have been stated before and satisfactorily answered; but having visited this country merely on business matters, and purposing shortly to return to England, I have no ready means of access to books of reference, and cannot satisfy myself whether such is the case. M. B. S.

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Philadelphia, January 30, 1839.

Mr. George Combe

Dear Sir,—Your remarks relating to the functions of the organ of Wit, in a recent lecture, suggested to my mind the following ideas, which I beg leave to submit to your consideration; and which I take the liberty of doing, because I understood you to say that the

functions of that organ are not now so fully understood and established as it is desirable they should be.

First, The Author of nature has furnished proper objects or sources for the exercise and gratification of all the powers of the mind. Secondly, By the laws which He has impressed upon the mind and external objects, a certain *adaptation* of manner is required also in the gratification of the functions of the brain. Is it not, therefore, the proper function of the organ of Wit, to discriminate between the proper and improper objects and sources furnished for the exercise of the faculties of the mind? and to observe the adapted and perceive the incongruous manner of their exercise?

Assuming that this is the proper function of the organ in question, let us see how *Wit* may be defined. Wit, then, may be defined to be the perception of the pertinent or appropriate in matter or manner, in word or in action. This definition applies to the proper or highest exercise of the function. The ludicrous, in this view of the subject, arises from the perception of the incongruity or inadaptation of one thing to another, either in matter or manner. The queer, droll, ridiculous, and grotesque, arise from the same cause, and are perceived and appreciated by the organ of Wit. Humour and caricature have their origin in this cause also. Levity seems to arise from clothing grave or sacred subjects in light and frivolous dresses, or from treating them in a trifling or sportive manner. Humour originates from the contrast between the subject and its garb, or from associating discordant things or ideas. Good wit seems to me to disapprove of levity, principally because it feels that it is paying too high a price for its gratification; but humour seems to be relished as profitable, and its essence is in a ratio of the difference between the subject or the matter and its mask.

In view of the above, let us make an application of these ideas to some particular faculties of the mind. The perception and relish of the beautiful are given to Ideality, and when the faculty is gratified with that which is really so, Wit is gratified also; or, in other words, suppose one person endowed with large Ideality, but deficient in Wit; a second with large Wit, but deficient in Ideality. The one with Wit, observing the other admiring that which was really elegant or beautiful, could not join in the emotions of admiration with him, because incapable of feeling them; but the symmetry might be so obvious, that he would perceive it, and he would be pleased with the pertinency of the admiration to the object admired, provided the manner was becoming. But suppose the individual with Wit large were to perceive another person exhibiting and admiring the rude or deformed in the place of the beautiful, the emotions he would then

experience would be very different. He would be impelled to ridicule. In the first instance, Wit would observe and approve the congruity; in the second, it would perceive the incongruity. Causality would seek the *cause* of these manifestations, and be content or pleased when the causes were comprehended; but I do not conceive that it would be better gratified in understanding the cause of the propriety, than it would in appreciating the cause of the impropriety. Byron had Wit and Ideality both large. His Ideality would admire a beautiful foot; but his Wit would prompt him to ridicule a deformed one, or at least the display of it. Hence his peculiar emotions. A deformed foot attached to a man disposed to be vain of his personal beauty!

Benevolence finds its proper exercise in mitigating misery and multiplying felicity; and when we see it displayed in providing asylums for the poor, lame, blind, and other sufferers of our kind, there is certainly nothing ludicrous in such a blessed manifestation of this benign function of our nature. But when we see it wasting its sacred flame in building and endowing asylums for superannuated, decrepid, or sickly brutes, birds, and insects—as I am told is the case with some of the Hindoos—Wit prompts us to laugh at the folly, and ridicule the performance.

I once knew a cooper, engaged in making a cask, become very much vexed and perplexed because of some difficulty he found in putting it together. He was a religious man, and would not swear; but he dashed the cask upon the floor, knocked it in pieces with his adze, jumped upon it and stamped it, as if he would grind it to powder. This scene was superlatively ludicrous. Wit laughed at it; and so did the old man, five minutes after the performance. But had this fearful display of Combativenes and Destructiveness been visited upon any thing capable of suffering, very different emotions would have been excited.

Wit laughs at the blunders of Causality, when it assigns that as the cause of an effect which is no cause at all. But a palpable cause pertinently assigned for an effect, gratifies Wit directly, but excites no disposition to ridicule.

When Philoprogenitiveness is manifested in attention to children, the pertinency of the exercise is pleasing to Wit; but when the same feeling is lavished upon cats, dogs, or monkeys, in the same manner that children are caressed, the ludicrous appears, and Wit laughs at it.

The ludicrous, therefore, plainly does not, I think, exist in nature herself, or any of her direct works; but it arises solely from the manner in which things of nature are associated or put together by intelligent beings. In this manner, perhaps, all the other functions

of the brain may be related to the function of Wit, and would certainly furnish ample range for its exercise.

Wit prompts all the faculties to do and say witty things, excites to the perpetration of jokes, and enjoys them; and is itself a weapon of defence when other instruments have failed.

I rejoice, sir, in knowing that your published works are exerting an extensive and salutary influence upon the minds of my countrymen; and I feel greatly indebted to you for the advantage my own mind has derived from them, together with your, to me, enchanting lectures.

With high regard, I am yours, &c.

S. W. FULLER.

98 St. John street.

ARTICLE IV.

REMARKS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CEREBRAL ORGANS BY ADEQUATE EXERCISE OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.* By Andrew Combe, M. D.

A good deal of interest has lately been excited on a question of very great practical importance, and which has too little occupied the attention even of practical phrenologists. It is—Whether, by regulated exercise of a mental power, the cerebral organ by which it is manifested can be increased in size; and, on the other hand, whether, by inaction of any faculty, the magnitude of its organ may be reduced?

On these points a diversity of opinions is entertained. By some it is affirmed that the nutrition and growth of an organ may be promoted or retarded almost at will, in proportion to the degree of exercise of its corresponding faculty. By others it is contended that exercise gives facility and readiness of action in the organ, but does not increase its size. It is, however, only by positive facts that the question can be settled; and I beg therefore to direct the reader's attention to their careful observation and more extensive collection, and to add a few remarks illustrative of the nature and tendency of the enquiry.

It is admitted on all hands, that different parts of the brain arrive at their full growth in succession; that the faculties corresponding to them increase in vigour in proportion as the organs advance; and

* From the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, vol. x, No. 51.

that, in all cases in which the latter fail to attain an average size, the mind remains to a like degree deficient in power. It is further agreed upon by physiologists, that in old age, when the mental faculties become impaired, a decrease in the size of the brain, and especially of its anterior lobes, also takes place; and in some instances to so great a degree as to excite surprise. Hence we may safely assume, first, that the brain grows and decays; and, secondly, that its different parts grow and decay unequally as to both time and extent. The next point to be ascertained is, whether exercise alone is in all cases sufficient to excite growth, and whether the same result is obtainable at every period of life?

In youth, when by the great law of nature growth is going on at any rate, in order to complete the development of the body, it is reasonable to suppose that organic increase will be more easily promoted in any given direction, than at a more advanced age, when nutrition is already becoming secondary to decay. Such, accordingly, we find to be the case with the muscular system; variations in the size of which are perfectly obvious to our senses, and recognised by all. The probability that the same law applies equally to the rest of the animal structure, and therefore also to the brain, is supported by many direct facts, showing the closely concomitant progress of mental power and cerebral development. But that *even after maturity*, when growth is no longer so energetic, any given portion of the brain may be rendered larger by assiduous exercise of its faculty, is a proposition which, however reasonable in itself, can be established only by the accumulation of well observed and indisputable facts.

That growth is easily promoted *in early life* by well directed exercise, we have ample evidence. We often see the arms, for example, greatly increased in volume by reiterated exercise, while, in the same individual, the legs, from being left in partial inaction, remain rather under the average bulk. Of this I lately saw a remarkable instance in a young Cambridge student, the muscles of whose arms and chest had, by dint of constant rowing in a boat, become developed in an extraordinary degree, while his lower extremities, from comparative inaction, remained rather slender in form and bulk. In blacksmiths the same contrast is observable, and from a similar cause; while in dancing-masters and pedestrians, on the other hand, the legs assume the predominance and the arms remain undeveloped. In like manner, we often see the chest enlarged in youth by indulgence in athletic exercises in the open air, giving rise to full and frequent respiration. For the same reason, the larynx and voice may be developed and strengthened by loud recitations, singing, and public speaking, all of which excite increased vascular and nutritive action

in the organs chiefly exercised. These facts, then, tend to show that at least in other structures than the brain, well directed activity leads to increase of organic development.

The brain, however, offers no exception to the general law; for we find by observation, not only that the mind improves in capacity and vigour by the systematic exercise of its faculties, but that its cerebral organs advance in development in proportion as the mind advances from the weakness of childhood to the vigorous energy of mature age. In the forehead, accordingly, a great change of shape and dimensions frequently occurs during the transition from youth to maturity, and corresponds exactly with the greater depth of reflection which begins at that time to impart to the character the comprehensiveness and solidity of manhood. The general size of the brain, indeed, is increased; and hence the distinction made by hatters in the size of "youths'" and "men's" hats—the latter being considerably larger than the former.

In youth, then, we may hold it as almost, if not altogether, certain, that increase of size in immature organs will generally follow judicious and sustained mental exercise. But as cases occur in which bodily exercise has little effect in augmenting muscular development, so there are also some in which the effects of mental exercise in promoting growth in the cerebral organs are equally unappreciable; on the causes of these *apparent* exceptions I shall afterwards offer a few remarks, and in the mean time pass on to consider the organic results of exercise in *mature* age.

The influence of exercise in adding to the development of organs in middle or mature life, when nutrition and decay are nearly equal, although decidedly less marked in rapidity and extent than in youth, is nevertheless in many instances still perfectly obvious. In the muscular system, for example, a longer period of regularly recurring exercise is undoubtedly required to increase its development; and the enlargement, when it does occur, rarely proceeds so far as after similar exertion in earlier life. The same rule holds with the chest and lungs. Their capacity is more easily and largely increased in youth than after growth is finished; but still, in the great majority of cases, a very visible increase *may* be obtained by the persevering fulfilment of the required conditions; and of this fact every one must have seen examples in his own experience.

If, then, (as it is quite logical to presume,) the same law presides over nutrition in all parts of the body, the strictest analogy leads us directly to the inference, that even in mature age the size of the individual organs of the brain *may* be increased by adequate exercise of the corresponding faculties, though, as a general rule, not so

rapidly, or to the same extent, as at an earlier period of life. It is consequently not absurd, but, on the contrary, perfectly in accordance with the ascertained laws of physiology, to believe that changes to a certain extent, in the proportions of the different cerebral organs, may occur from a continued and marked difference in their opportunities of action. But the fact can be established only by *direct* and undeniable evidence; and hence it becomes a matter of deep interest to the phrenologist to procure, at intervals of a few years, careful and accurate casts of the heads of such individuals as have been subjected to any change of pursuits or circumstances, sufficiently permanent and considerable to have called into play a different order of mental powers from that formerly in activity. If, on comparing such casts, distinct changes in form and proportion are perceptible, a practical result of immense value to the educationist and legislator will be incontrovertibly established; and if, on the other hand, no difference appears, the fact will still be useful in showing us clearly the limits by which our power of modifying development and character is bounded, and thus relieve us from aiming at the accomplishment of objects which in the very nature of things may be unattainable.

In the museum of the Phrenological Society, very few casts of the description alluded to are to be found; and those which bear upon the point, refer chiefly to the period antecedent to mature age. In several living heads I have remarked what, from very attentive inspection, I consider as undeniable increase of size in individual organs; but casts not having been obtained at the time of the first observation, it is now impossible to substantiate the reality of the change to the satisfaction of others. The presumption of accuracy is strengthened, however, by the concurring statements of several phrenologists, each of whom, unknown to the others, took notice of the alteration. But to that enterprising phrenologist, Mr. Deville, of London, the honour is especially due, of having for several years past devoted great attention, and not more than it deserves, to the question under consideration. By unwearied exertion, that gentleman has now collected a considerable number of casts taken from the same individuals at different intervals of time, and, as I am informed, *demonstrating* an extent of change in many of them, of which, till lately, no adequate conception was entertained; and along with this change there has been in every instance as decided an alteration of the mental character. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details of Mr. Deville's collection to be able to enumerate the individual instances as evidence; but it is said that some of them are of a very striking and conclusive description; and it is much to be wished that an authentic account of them, with lithographic outlines of the

heads, and a statement of the circumstances attending the alteration of character, were given to the public. Such an account would be both a guide and a stimulus to other observers, and would form a nucleus for a body of very instructive evidence. I have heard that some of the cases show that, even in advanced age, an organ may become enlarged by due exercise, although the probability of such increase is then greatly smaller than in youth. In proof of this, Mr. Deville shows casts of the forehead of the late Sir William Herschel, who, it is well known, devoted himself to astronomical studies after the age of fifty, and then laid aside that of music, to which he had previously been addicted; and on comparing the cast taken at the age of fifty-six with one taken some years earlier, a marked increase in the organs required for the mathematician is observable in it, while the organ of Tune has decreased. I have seen these casts; and if they really be taken from the same head, the great difference in the development cannot be disputed. The celebrated Broussais is another instance of growth of organ from a change of pursuit late in life. He states that, within two or three years, after being much engaged in deep reflection and argumentative study, his organs of Causality became so much enlarged that the difference was perceptible by measurement. In the present number of this Journal, also, a remarkable case of a similar enlargement of the organs of Philoprogenitiveness and Adhesiveness, from long excitement of the corresponding feelings, is communicated by a correspondent. A cast of the head ought if possible to be obtained.

In reference to the possibility of increased development of brain about the time of maturity, I may mention that, in lately looking over a volume of engravings of a series of coins and historical medals, struck by Bonaparte to commemorate the chief events of his own extraordinary career, my attention was arrested by the great difference which appears between his earlier and later likenesses in regard to the general size and shape of the head, and especially of the forehead and organs of the reflecting faculties. In the beginning of the series, where he figures only as a general officer, the medals present the forehead as very full over the eyebrows, in the region of the perceptive organs—but as sloping somewhat in the reflective region—presenting almost a contrast to the broad and lofty expanse of brow which we see on all the coins and busts of his later years, and which we are in the habit of considering as so peculiarly distinctive of him. In the early medallions, too, the head runs up to a point of Self-esteem and Firmness, in a manner different from those of a later date, in which Self-esteem is represented not as really smaller, but as flanked on each side by a much larger Love of Approbation than

formerly, and, consequently, presenting a broad and bulging instead of a pointed appearance. The size of the entire head is also represented as progressively larger as he advances towards full maturity.

It may be said, that these differences of form and size in the head of Bonaparte were not real, but must have proceeded from the artists not having been careful to give the precise configuration which he possessed. If the series of coins and medals had been small, and executed by only one or two artists, the objection would have been not without weight; but seeing that the specimens of which it consists amount to several hundreds, that the series continues through a regular progression of years, and that the outline and features of all the earlier ones, even by different artists, bear a strong general resemblance, while a gradual transition takes place to the remarkable outline and features which characterise all the later specimens, we must admit, either that the head actually changed, and that its varying form was copied accurately from nature; or, that at one time all the artists followed an ideal model of their own, which they afterwards rejected to put another equally ideal in its place. The latter explanation seems to me so improbable, and the former so much more in accordance, not only with the laws of physiology, but with the changed situation and expanded character of the man, that I cannot but adopt it in preference, and entertain a very strong desire that every effort should be made to determine, by positive evidence, whether such a change actually occurred or not. Perhaps some of the Parisian phrenologists may have the means of ascertaining the fact. If so, I trust that they will not lose sight of the opportunity. Besides the existing cast of the head taken after death (when the size of the brain had in all probability already decreased by the combined effects of inactivity and disease—for no man ever made so great a change as he did, in passing from the throne and government of Europe to the solitude of St. Helena), there are several of the later busts; and one in particular, known to have been modeled with scrupulous accuracy, and with constant reference to the head by measurement. From a comparison of these with the busts and portraits of his youth, a pretty accurate approximation to the truth might be arrived at. But, for this purpose, the examination ought to be conducted with great care, and free from the influence of bias on either side.

In attaching a good deal of weight to this probable difference in the size and configuration of the head of Bonaparte in youth and in maturity, I do not mean to affirm that the busts of either period are *literal* transcripts from nature. In the medals of his early life, we perceive many little varieties in the outline of the nose, mouth, and

chin, as well as of the head itself, which do not affect the general likeness. This shows, that while each artist did not hesitate to make slight deviations to bring the likeness within his own line of classic beauty, all of them still felt themselves tied down to a standard, from which they could not depart far without also departing from the truth of nature. The presumption is therefore very great, that, both in the more sloping head of the early medals, and in the capacious head and magnificent expanse of brow which impart to the later busts so much of the quiet impressiveness of power, the type of the original has been adhered to, although the general dimensions may be somewhat exaggerated.

If, then, it be admitted that increase of size does occur in the cerebral organs, attended by greater vigour of mental function, the question naturally presents itself—Is the observed increase in the organ the antecedent or cause of the enlarged power of mind? or is the active mental excitement the cause of the farther development of the organ? If the former be the case, before we can turn our knowledge practically to account, we must discover what the conditions are which stimulate the growth of the brain; whereas, if the latter alone be sufficient, it may be turned to excellent account in promoting the farther development, not only of the intellectual powers, but of the moral sentiments, and thus become an instrument for the formation and improvement of character which cannot fail to be productive of most beneficial results.

Experience, however, shows that something more than mere exercise is required to secure the growth of a bodily organ. On tracing the progress of the organisation from infancy to its full development in manhood, we cannot account for the different results which follow equal exercise, unless we admit the existence of some original type, principle, or law, inherent in the constitution, by which the future growth of its different parts is regulated, not certainly with fixed or mathematical exactness, but still to an extent which renders it impossible for us to induce a radical cure. Thus, in one member of a family we perceive such a decided tendency to the predominance of the muscular system, that exercise developes all its parts with ease and rapidity; while in another the same exercise has scarcely any effect. In a third, again, there is an equal predominance of the nervous system, attended with a corresponding facility of greater development in it by means of *mental* exercise. There is a *something*, in short, in the original type of every individual constitution, which in some degree directs the future form and qualities of the organisation, and sets a limit to our power of modifying it. Thus, of twenty children brought up in the same school, and under the

same treatment, no two will proceed alike in the growth of their several organs. One will be remarkable for an expanded chest and muscular frame; another for weak muscles, a narrow chest, and large head; a third will be tall and straight; and a fourth short and round-shouldered. And this is considered to be quite natural, because their original types or constitutions are different; and it seems to have been a part of the Creator's design that such differences should exist.

Admitting, then, that there is a type or quality inherent in every constitution, which, independently of and prior to exercise, tends to the earlier and more complete development of one part of the system than of another; and that, therefore, the same kind of cultivation will not produce precisely the same results in all, it follows, that increased activity and capacity of mind must often be, particularly in youth, the consequence and not the cause of a more perfect organisation; and hence, when we observe increasing vigour of mind coincident with enlarging organs, we are by no means justified in at once deciding that mental excitement is always the sole, or even the chief cause of the organic change. In many instances, the aptitude for study, which occasionally breaks out unexpectedly, is really the consequence of a naturally advancing organisation, although, in its turn, its active indulgence promotes the healthy development of the latter by the due exercise of its peculiar function. If there was not some such impediment to indefinite increase in the organisation and extension in the faculty, education ought to be much more successful in imparting talent than it is ever found to be, even under the most favourable combination of circumstances. How often have we to regret that expense and trouble are lavished in vain, in attempting to develope powers of mind and moral feelings which nature has denied! If exercise sufficed in all cases to procure their endowment, no such disappointments could be experienced.

But while thus directing our attention to the influence of the original type or constitution in facilitating or impeding the future development of the brain, it must be admitted that well regulated exercise of the mental faculties is the most powerful means of promoting the growth of their organs. At first sight this may seem a strange proposition; and yet it is in strict accordance with the best established laws in physiology. It is true, as just shown, that functional activity is not the only means of promoting organic development, and that its influence is not the same in any two individuals. But when judiciously directed, mental exercise always leads to *some improvement*, both in the working of the faculty and in the condition of its organ; and if it fails to produce its full effect in many instances, this is only because other counteracting causes are at work to diminish

its efficiency. In all, the *tendency* is the same, for Nature is ever faithful to her trust; and if we remove the obstacles which obstruct her progress in individual cases, we may rely on our success.

Facts, however, are not wanting to prove, that, even in mature age, a complete change of circumstances, rousing to vigorous and sustained activity a different set of faculties from those previously called into play, has led to a distinctly increased development of cerebral organs, just as we see a change from sedentary to active life add in a marked degree to muscular development. Mr. Kirtley's case, in the present number of this Journal, is one of them, if the fact of the enlargement be admitted. Illness concentrated the attention of a mother upon her children for a length of time, till she began to feel an interest in them never experienced before. This excitement of maternal affection was necessarily accompanied by increased vascular action in the corresponding organs, and this in the end seems to have become so sustained as to lead to permanently increased development.* Mr. Deville has observed some other cases equally strong, and in one respect much more satisfactory, as he possesses demonstrative evidence of actual change in the form of the head—casts of them, showing the difference, having been taken and preserved.

Here, then, is an important fact—that activity, in some instances, increases organic size even in mature age. The next enquiry, and one of not less moment, is to discover *why the increase does not follow in every instance?* and what are the conditions which favour it?

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE V.

APPLICATION OF PHRENOLOGY TO SELF-CULTURE.

Philadelphia, February 8th, 1839.

MR. EDITOR,—

One of the most important practical results of a proper application of phrenology, is the immense aid which it promises to every reflecting individual in forming a correct estimate of his own character, and in rectifying it accordingly. In proportion to the degree of attention which a person has bestowed on any subject, will be the readiness with which he will detect and investigate any change in its aspect and

* See the rationale of this increase explained in "The Principles of Physiology, applied to the Preservation of Health," &c. 5th edit. pages 148 and 302.

relations. A thousand interesting phenomena in the natural world may be daily and hourly occurring before the eyes of an individual, and still be overlooked by him; not so much from the want of powers to observe, as from ignorance of the existence of objects adapted to the exercise of such powers. His attention has never been drawn especially towards them, and as far as he is concerned, they are as though they were not. From a cause similar to this it is that the germs of the greatest discoveries have lain dormant for ages; and when at last light has burst forth, men have gaped with astonishment that the truth had not long before forced itself on their notice. This will apply with force, not only to that department of nature which is the subject-matter of phrenology, but to the good consequences resulting from a proper attention to the science itself. The penetration of Gall perceived a relationship between numerous facts which, before his time, had escaped attention, from their apparently isolated and dissimilar character; or it would be better to say, that though observed, they were looked upon as the offspring of mere chance, and hence could be regarded in a more philosophic light *only* by a mind that perceived chance in nothing, but law in every thing. But this relationship, once discovered, had the effect of drawing attention to other facts and other relations, until a beautiful system of nature displayed itself, which now, in the science of phrenology, commands the deepest admiration of all wise and intelligent minds. In turn will phrenology now, in a similar manner, draw the attention of men to phenomena in their own minds; phenomena, a proper understanding of which is often of great importance in the conduct of life, but which have hitherto been neglected, for want of some polar star like phrenology to direct research. This science has drawn aside the veil of metaphysics, revealed in a great measure the hidden arcana of the mind, and displayed one of the most beautiful and harmonious arrangements ever yet met with in any known province of the creation. It is this simplicity in the arrangement of the elements of the mind, at once so intelligent and so fascinating, that promises to enlist multitudes in the investigation of their mental endowments, who during the reign of metaphysical speculations would never have ventured upon a task *then* so laborious, uncertain, and unprofitable. Now, however, the path is clear; at each progressive step, new light and beauty burst on the delighted enquirer, and he soon becomes familiar with the few and simple laws which regulate the endless diversity of human character. He analyses and sits in judgment on the workings of his own mind. No matter how complex, or how varied in its associations, any emotion may be, it is easily dissected, and each of its components referred to its proper origin. In this

process, they may be made to pass in review before the moral sentiments and intellect—the influence and activity of each duly estimated, and approved or condemned accordingly.

The design of the present communication is to allude briefly to the assistance which may be derived from phrenology in discovering defects in one's own mental constitution, and in applying the remedies. Many individuals no doubt are to be found who possess one or more faculties, either so small by nature, or so inactive by circumstances, that their existence is hardly suspected. Occasionally, however, a person of this description may be so situated as to have his dormant faculties momentarily excited; the novel sensation thus suddenly experienced may occasion a little surprise at the time, and be then no longer thought of until a second or third recurrence of the same unusual sensation, at distant intervals, attracts more attention, and perhaps its cause is referred to some peculiar idiosyncrasy, or it is regarded as wholly inexplicable. It is to such persons that phrenology is invaluable, both by directing attention more closely to the unwonted phenomena, and by affording an explanation of them. Thus not only is the individual benefited, but the strongest kind of proof obtained of the truth of the new philosophy.

The following will illustrate the above remarks, which it is hoped will prove useful to persons similarly situated:—

From early childhood the writer has at various times observed, that a well known landscape, or other assemblage of familiar objects—as a room with furniture, streets, houses, &c.—have assumed quite a novel and interesting aspect. The landscape, beautiful in itself, yet grown so familiar as to be regarded nearly with indifference, at times struck the eye with all that sense of charming freshness which would probably accompany a first view of it. It was presented as a whole; each leading feature stood out from the rest, and every object assumed its proper importance in forming the perspective. The prospect seemed to be as it were turned round, and placed at right angles or opposite to its real situation, while the point of observation was also apparently changed. This alteration in the aspect of a landscape sometimes occurred spontaneously, sometimes was easily produced by a voluntary effort, and sometimes not. Various fanciful conjectures arose as to what might be the cause of this phenomenon; but no satisfactory solution seemed to offer itself, until the writer, having had his attention drawn to phrenology, learned from a popular lecturer on this science that his perceptive faculties were deficient. It followed, that if the above phenomenon were owing to an *occasional* activity of these naturally weak faculties, nothing more was requisite than to stimulate them into action by the will, in order to

reproduce and continue this pleasing sensation in the exercise of vision. The experiment was tried, and succeeded; a new mode of mental exercise had been developed, and was accompanied by a pleasure, perhaps not so intense, but certainly analogous, to that felt by a blind or deaf person on the sudden removal of his imperfection. In a walk taken for the sake of enjoying this new kind of mental action, the combination of scene in the natural picture—sky, clouds, fields, houses, &c.—were viewed with such an intensity and satisfaction for the space of three hours, that a severe headach was the consequence immediately after. The locality of this pain, viz. right over the eyebrows, and about the root of the nose, coinciding precisely with the phrenological position of the organs exercised, viz. Form, Size, Colour, Individuality, and Locality.

It may be proper to state further—First, That simultaneously with the vivid exercise of these faculties, there was a strong desire to copy on paper all the objects observed. Secondly, That straining the eyes to see distant or faint objects, would appear, from the following circumstance, to affect the brain more powerfully than the eye itself. During a walk, the writer took off a pair of near-sighted glasses, and made, for ten minutes, strong efforts to see well without them. A severe headach over the eyebrows followed, but the eyes were not sensibly affected.

A word in regard to a *physiological* proof of phrenology, which any one may put to the test in his own person.

Every one knows, and has felt, that when both mind and body have been at rest for some time, sensation is predominant in no one organ more than in the rest; but that after exercise of any single part, sensation becomes predominant in that part. For example—after a very hearty meal, the predominant sensation of the body is in the region of the stomach; after a fatiguing walk, it is in the legs; after long stooping, it is in the muscles of the back, &c. Now the same holds good with respect to the brain. Violent and continued exercise of any one or more organs, will be found to occasion a very augmented sensation, if not absolute headach, in the region of such organs. A man never feels more sensibly that *he has a head*, than after severe mental labour, even though pain be not produced; and if due attention be given, the finger can be laid on the very organs in which sensation is concentrated—a sense of tenseness or tightness—as though the brain pressed outwardly against the skull. The writer is certainly not alone in experience of this circumstance; and the knowledge of it is useful, as it shows, perhaps, that for successful study, action must be induced in the brain by an effort of the will, and kept up there by the same means until fatigue is induced, and rest becomes necesssary. W. H. M.

ARTICLE VI.

PHRENOLOGY IN NEW YORK.

It is generally expected, that a journal particularly devoted to the interests of any science, will not only present to the public the facts and various applications of the principles connected with that science, but will also record, from time to time, its progress. It is especially important, in the early history of a science, that correct statements should be made on this subject, in order to acquaint the public generally with the facts in the case, as well as to transmit them to posterity. While such information may be interesting at the present time, it will hereafter be deemed far more valuable in the history of the *science of the mind.* As this Journal is designed to be national and permanent, we shall take particular pains to collect and present, as may be convenient, the history and state of phrenology at different times in this country. And our readers may rely on the accuracy of all statements of this kind, which they may find recorded in the Phrenological Journal. In No. 4 of the Journal, we presented an account of "Phrenology in Boston," and we now propose to furnish our readers with a similar sketch of the science, particularly as connected with the reception of Mr. George Combe's lectures, in New York. Our statements in this article will be confined rather to the present state of the science than its earlier history.

Phrenology in New York.—There are many able and decided advocates of the science in this city. During last season (we think in the month of September or October) a phrenological society was formed. The New York Whig contained at the time the following account of the formation of this society, and its officers:—"It will be remembered, that in our eighth number we strongly recommended to our fellow-citizens the formation of a phrenological society. We are happy to learn that one has since been formed; which, from the talents, character, and standing, of such of the members as we have heard named, will doubtless take high rank among scientific and philosophical societies. We have been informed that, at a recent election, the following gentlemen were chosen to the principal offices of the society, and that each has accepted of his appointment:—Dr. John W. Francis, President; Dr. J. C. Beales, Vice President; Dr. A. Sidney Doane, Corresponding Secretary; Dr. Caleb Ticknor, Recording Secretary; Dr. Benjamin Drake, Treasurer. A corps of officers more talented or energetic, it would have been very difficult to select.

We expect much from this society, and have little fear of being disappointed."

We regret that we are unable to present any particulars respecting the operations of this society. We have seen it stated in the New York papers, that several of the above named gentlemen have lectured on phrenology during the winter, not only to members of the society, but to large, intelligent, and respectable audiences, collected from the citizens. From the superior talents and high standing, especially in the medical profession, of the officers of this society, there can be no doubt but what it will prove a valuable auxiliary in establishing and propagating phrenological principles in the city of New York. The influence of this society was undoubtedly very favourable in preparing the way for, and creating a more general interest in, the lectures of Mr. Combe. The regular number of Mr. C.'s auditors was generally between three and four hundred. In No. 4 of this Journal, we presented an extract from a letter, giving some account of the reception of those lectures while they were progressing. The writer of the same letter, who is a valuable contributor to this Journal, has furnished us with the following interesting information, respecting the close of Mr. C.'s lectures, and the general state of the science in that city.

To the Editor of the American Phrenological Journal.

New York, February 11, 1839.

Dear Sir,—

In my last to you,* I ventured to predict that the lectures of Mr. Combe would do much to place phrenology in this city on its proper level. I now believe that those lectures did as much as any single course could accomplish towards advancing a knowledge and belief in the science. But his stay was altogether too short, to enable him to produce an abiding impression on the minds of a people as active, as engrossed with business—as much intellectually fed day by day, through the public press and public lectures—as are the people of this great commercial metropolis. Could Mr. Combe reside with us a year, and during that time give some four or five full courses, and also become personally acquainted with most of the leading minds of the city, he might make an abiding impression. But while I make these remarks, I do not mean to say that phrenology has no believers or friends here whose attachment and faith are abiding. Far from it. I believe that phrenology is much more believed in than is generally known. Many people really believe much on the subject, and evince

* See No. 4. page 126.

a great degree of curiosity to become more informed by conversation, who, if asked whether they were believers in it, would answer no; or if requested to attend a course of public lectures, would beg to be excused.

People are mistakenly led to suppose, that when there is little or no conversation on phrenology in fashionable circles, and when the public press is comparatively silent, that the science is dying away. As well might you say of the Christian religion, that, when there was no special interest on the subject in a place, there was no belief in christianity. Whenever any subject or science has been ridiculed as has phrenology, all that portion of the community of too little moral courage to do or say an unfashionable or unpopular thing, conceal their real sentiments from the world. In a city like this, I need not say that of just such persons is a great mass of the leading and influential part of the public composed. This remark applies in a special manner to the members of the three learned professions, and all those connected with public institutions. None have been more timid in the frank avowal of their belief than the clergy; though they have done the science probably much less lasting injury than members of the medical profession. Phrenology, as the true physiology of the brain, and as explaining the only true philosophy of the disease of insanity, becomes an important branch of medical education. The clergy, deeply engaged in their own duties, look to the members of the medical profession for their opinions; and many of these taking their direction from the famous attack of Mr. Gordon, in the Edinburgh Review, turned their influence against it.

But I see decided and clear evidence that prejudice, opposition, and ridicule, are beginning to yield to the "sober second thought" which marks the workings of a love of truth, and the exercise of a deliberate judgment.

First, then, I find the younger portion of our most intelligent clergymen are constantly in the habit of delivering sermons, and giving views of human nature, strikingly consistent with, if not in veiled phrenology. They never mention the word, it is true, nor do they use any of its technical language. But they come out with its doctrines in such a way, that a phrenologist can almost tell the book and page from which they derived suggestions for their trains of thought. I find no fault with this. They think they take lawfully, and mean to heed well the advice of "stealing judiciously." They do good by it; because they prepare, as it were, the public mind, by stealth, for the reception of phrenology at no distant day, openly, boldly, and heartily. Their hearers will only say, why "this is just what I have always believed."

The younger portion of the medical profession through the country generally, and not less in this city than in other places, are mostly believers to a certain extent, and treat the subject with respect. The writer has never lectured upon the science in this city, but he has formerly done so extensively in the New England states; and he feels no hesitancy in saying, that the real progress of phrenology, both in this city and through the country generally, has been great for the last five years. Still it flows much, if I may so say, in covered channels and under currents. For myself, I really think that its progress is quite as great as could be expected, I had almost said wished. We must not expect that every body will feel an interest in the science. If it were as generally believed as any other branch of physiology, but a very small portion of the entire mass of the community would have tastes or time for the study and cultivation of it. Mr. Combe estimated that not more than five per cent. of a class, attending a popular course of phrenological lectures, would become so far believers as to take a permanent interest in it. The same precisely might be said of physiology. And I venture to affirm now, that in this country generally, and in New York in particular, phrenology at this moment is understood by more persons, and excites more attention, than the science of physiology in general; and, moreover, that the increasing attention to physiology, now perceptible, is owing to the impulse given to it, and taste excited for it, by the study and diffusion of phrenology. The small popular work of Dr. Andrew Combe on Physiology, has done more than all other books, and all the popular lectures recently delivered, to excite an interest in, and give an acquaintance with, the leading topics of physiology in this country. He is scarcely inferior to his brother as a phrenologist; and has avowed himself its advocate in this work—a work which, I venture to say, would never have been thought of, but for his researches in phrenology. Yours, &c.

S. J.

P. S. I send you a copy of the resolutions, which were adopted unanimously by the class that attended Mr. Combe's lectures.

S. J.

Resolved, That the members of the class who have attended the course of phrenological lectures delivered by George Combe, Esq., at Clinton Hall, entertain a lively sense of obligation to the distinguished lecturer for the valuable information he has communicated to us during the lectures just closed; that we have been greatly pleased and instructed by the clear, felicitous, and convincing manner in which he has imparted to us his varied and profound knowledge of the philosophy of mind; and that we regard phrenology as eminently calculated to advance the cause

of education, to improve the institutions of society and of government, and to elevate the condition of the human race.

Resolved, That in Mr. Combe we recognise the most successful advocate of phrenological science, the philosopher and the philanthropist; and that phrenology, as explained and illustrated by him, claims, in our opinion, the attention of all those who would investigate mind philosophically, and who desire the diffusion of truth and the exaltation of the moral and intellectual faculties of man.

Resolved, That in the application of phrenology to the investigation of human character, and the practical purposes of life, we perceive a new era in mental and physiological science, in which we believe human enquiry will be greatly facilitated, and the amount of human happiness essentially increased.

Resolved, That inasmuch as prejudice may deter many individuals from attending Mr. Combe's lectures in other cities of our country, which he proposes to visit, and as the truth and importance of phrenology can be understood and appreciated only after an examination of its principles, we recommend to such citizens an attendance upon his *entire course;* being convinced that they will find their own advantage in doing so, and that they will thereby become better able to judge of the truth and practical utility of the science.

Resolved, That entertaining these views and feelings, we take great pleasure in tendering an expression of them to Mr. Combe, and in adding our most hearty wishes for his personal happiness, and for his long continued usefulness to his fellow-men.

Resolved, That Silas Jones, Esq., Counsellor at Law and Superintendent of the New York Institution for the Blind; Judah Hammond, Esq., Judge of the Marine Court; John B. Scott, Esq., Judge of the Marine Court; Loring D. Chapin, Esq., Member of the New York Legislature, &c.; Robert Sedgwick, Esq., Counsellor at Law, &c.; A. Lee, M. D., Professor of Materia Medica in the New York University; B. F. Joslin, M. D., Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in the New York University; E. Parmley, M. D.; J. Neilson, M. D.; J. W. Francis, M. D.; A. S. Doane, Professor of Physiology in the New York University; Caleb Ticknor, Professor of Hygiene in the New York University; and Joel Foster, M. D., be a committee to present to Mr. Combe the foregoing resolutions, and that the same be published in the newspapers of this city.

JOHN B. SCOTT, Chairman.

NEW YORK, Dec. 22, 1838.

The celebrated Broussais, of Paris, whose death has recently been announced in the medical journals of this city, has been for many years an able, decided, and zealous advocate of the science of phrenology. In 1831, he aided in the formation of the Paris Phrenological Society; and since that, has constantly taken an active and frequently an official part in its proceedings. He has been a valuable contributor to the Paris Phrenological Journal, and has also published several works on the science. In 1836, when the subject of phrenology came before the Royal Academy of Medicine for discussion, Broussais took the lead in its defence; and even when arrested by the hand of death, he was actively engaged in preparing an answer to the Memoir of M. Jouffroy against the science. M. Amussat, who attended him in his last illness,

and M. Bouillard, who pronounced a discourse over his grave, are both distinguished phrenologists. Broussais died on the 18th of November, 1838, aged 66; and had been for some time physician-in-chief to the Val-de-Grâce, professor of general pathology in the Ecole de Médecine, and a commander of the Legion of Honour.

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Phrenological Society in Buffalo, N. Y.—In our last number, we gave a short notice of the state of phrenology in Buffalo, N. Y., particularly as connected with the lectures of Mr. Grimes. Since giving that account, we are gratified in learning from the Buffalo Daily Journal, that a phrenological society has been organised under the title of "*Western Phrenological Society, at Buffalo,*" of which the following gentlemen were elected officers:—J. S. Grimes, President; W. K. Scott and I. S. Smith, Vice Presidents; R. W. Haskins, Corresponding Secretary; C. H. Raymond, Recording Secretary; J. T. Lacy, Treasurer; G. E. Hayes, H. B. Myer, R. G Snow, O. G. Steele, and C. C. Bristol, Managers.

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Mr. Combe commences his second course of lectures in this city on the second of March. His last course was attended by large audiences, and gave great satisfaction. We have no doubt but that the next will be equally as well if not better attended.

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Our next number will contain a cut of Mr. Combe's bust, showing the location of the organs. This cut will be accompanied with notes, taken from some of his lectures, embracing many interesting facts, and designed particularly for those who are engaged in studying the elementary principles of the science.

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Our readers will find this number enlarged eight pages. The future numbers of the Journal will probably be increased sixteen pages, making each number forty-eight instead of thirty-two pages. We shall make some explanations in our next, respecting the proposed enlargement, as well as some other statements in regard to this Journal.

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
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